To the extent that, as described above, accurate likelihood ratings require greater 126 reflective effort than choices, discriminability may be reduced in older than in younger 127 adults. Controlled cognitive processes (e.g., explicit memory) that are linked to metacognitive 128 abilities necessary for self-reflection show age-related decline (Hartshorne & Germine, 2015;  129 Salthouse, 2006) . Moreover, relative to younger adults older adults seem to be constrained in 130 drawing samples from memory (Hansson, Rönnlund, Juslin, & Nilsson, 2008 )-which might 131 be necessary to accurately assess the likelihood of one's behavior. Older adults also show 132 greater decrements in decision quality when choosing between multiple options than when 133 choosing between only two (Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015) . Hence, older adults may be 134 poorer than younger adults at discriminating risky and safe choices on the basis of their 135 likelihood ratings. If so, age-related differences on self-report measures of risk taking may be 136 biased by age differences in people's ability to self-reflect on their choice behavior.
137
Further, a wealth of research exploring individual differences in risk taking has 138 shown that older adults are typically less willing to take risks than younger adults (Denburg, 139 Tranel, & Bechara, 2005; Henninger, Madden, & Huettel, 2010; Rolison, Hanoch, & Wood, 140 2012; Zamarian et al., 2008) . If response criterion in likelihood ratings is adaptive, older 141 adults should show a more conservative criterion.
142

Aims of the Current Study
143
To examine the relationship between self-reported likelihood of choosing a risky 144 option and actual choice behavior, participants were shown the same set of gambles in two 145 types of tasks. In one of the tasks, they were asked to report their likelihood of risk taking
146
("Indicate the likelihood that you would accept this gamble"), and in the other task, to make 147 choices ("Do you accept or reject this gamble?"). On the basis that self-report measures 148 typically study ambiguous real world activities whereas behavioral tasks usually make 149 information about all possible outcomes available, we examined whether task ambiguity affects the relationship between likelihood ratings and choice. On the basis that likelihood 151 ratings might require greater reflective effort than choices, we further examined whether 152 individual differences in decision making, and in particular age differences, affect the 153 mapping between likelihood ratings and choice behavior. In addition, we tested whether 154 reductions in the willingness to choose a risky option under ambiguity and in older adults were aged 41-50 years, 77 were aged 51-60 years, 119 were aged 61-69 years, and six were 173 aged 70-85 years. Almost all participants (98%) had completed lower secondary or 174 vocational education and more than half (62%) had completed higher vocational or university education. A minority (7%) had an annual household income below $10,000. For most, their 176 household income ranged $10,000 and $50,000 (54%) or $50,000 and $60,000 (30%). Few 177 (9%) had a household income above $100,000. $30), and chances to win and lose, respectively (25%, 50%, 75%). In the unambiguous 181 condition, complete information about the gain and loss amounts and the chances to win and 182 lose of each gamble was provided. In the ambiguous condition, the gain amount, loss amount,
183
or the chances to win and lose was not provided (as indicated by a "?"; Appendix A).
184
Design and procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to receive either 185 unambiguous (N = 249) or ambiguous (N = 251) gambles (see Appendix B for instructions).
186
In a likelihood rating task, participants viewed the same 27 gambles and were asked "Please 187 indicate the likelihood that you would accept this gamble" on a 7-point scale (1 = "extremely 188 unlikely", 2 = "moderately unlikely", 3 = "somewhat unlikely", 4 = "not sure", 5 =
189
"somewhat likely", 6 = "moderately likely, 7 = "extremely likely"). The likelihood rating 190 scale was modelled after rating scales used in the literature to measure risk-taking propensity 191 (Blais & Weber, 2006; Weber et al., 2002) . In a choice task, participants were asked for each 192 of the 27 gambles "Do you accept or reject this gamble?". They indicated choice by selecting 193 an "accept" or "reject" option. The order of the two tasks was counterbalanced. Within each 194 task, participants were presented each gamble one at a time in random order. A blank screen 195 followed each response before presentation of the next gamble in the set.
196
In the ambiguous condition, participants were additionally presented with a third 197 task that followed the choice task and likelihood rating task and were asked to indicate for 198 each of the 27 gambles what they believed to be the unknown gamble amounts and chances. 
Results
209
We first briefly summarise analyses of participants' choices and likelihood ratings often than ones with a lower expected value and they also provided higher likelihood ratings 213 for the former. Further, gambles were less often accepted in the ambiguous than in the 214 unambiguous condition and there was a trend toward lower likelihood ratings for ambiguous 215 gambles; replicating previous findings, participants were thus ambiguity averse. We also 216 found that compared to younger participants, older participants accepted the gambles less 217 frequently and also provided lower likelihood ratings. Two-way interactions revealed that 218 participants were less responsive to differences in the expected value of ambiguous gambles 219 than they were for unambiguous gambles in both their decisions and likelihood ratings. Age 220 interacted with the expected value of gambles, such that older age was associated with 221 reduced sensitivity to differences in the gambles' expected values. Figure 1A shows the average likelihood ratings as a function of 248 the percentage of accepted gambles split at low and high levels of discriminability. As can be 249 seen, for participants with lower discriminability the average likelihood ratings were slightly more regressive, and therefore less indicative of the proportion of accepted gambles, than for 251 participants with higher discriminability. Figure A). For example, for one set of three gambles, the gain amount was equal to $10, the chances 267 to win and lose were equal to 25% and 75%, respectively, and the loss amount increased from Figure A1 ). However, as reported earlier, participants were also less likely to accept the response to the differences in the frequency of acceptance cases between the conditions.
289
How does age influence the correspondence between likelihood ratings and choice?
290
There was a quadratic age trend in discriminability in the ambiguous condition (β linear = 1.82, 291 t = 3.70, p < .001; β quadratic = -1.77, t = 3.62, p < .001), but no age effect in the unambiguous 292 condition (β linear = .78, t = 1.65, p = .100; β quadratic = -.73, t = 1.55, p = .123). However, when 293 controlling for choice consistency, there was a significant quadratic age trend in Finally, we tested for a general association between individual differences in risk 305 taking-measured as the percentage of accepted gambles-and the response criterion. A 306 linear regression revealed that higher risk taking was strongly associated with a lower 307 response criterion (β = -.62, t = 17.48, p < .001; Figure 2D ). This strong association remained 308 after controlling for individual differences in age (β = -.62, t = 17.44, p < .001), which we 309 found previously were correlated with the response criterion. Inspecting Figure 2D , 310 participants who accepted fewer than half of the gambles (i.e., were risk averse) had a 311 conservative response criterion, which means that they falsely identified few instances in 312 which they rejected a gamble (low false alarm rate), but also missed many instances in which 313 they accepted a gamble (low hit rate rate). Conversely, participants who accepted more than 314 half of the gambles (i.e., were risk seeking) had a liberal response criterion ( Figure 2D ), 315 meaning that in their likelihood ratings they falsely identified many instances in which they 316 rejected a gamble (high false alarm rate), but also identified many instances in which gambles 317 were accepted (high hit rate). This again is indicative of adaptive response criterion setting.
318
Additionally, and surprisingly, risk taking was also associated with discriminability (β = -.12, 319 t = 2.70, p = .007): participants who accepted a higher number of gambles tended to show 320 lower discriminability ( Figure 2C ).
321
Discussion
322
Research on individual differences in risk taking has implicitly assumed that people either provided (Holt & Laury, 2002; Figner et al., 2009) or this information can be learned 332 over the course of the experimental session (Bechara et al., 1997; Lejuez et al., 2002 ). We advertised to be 1 in 5'. Further, 'Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability' could be 363 modified to 'Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability and break your leg with a 364 chance of 10%'. To foster comprehension of the added risk information (and to avoid that 365 responses are driven more by the person's numeracy than their risk propensity), the 366 information could be presented in a graphical format, such as icon arrays (Rolison, Morsanyi, 367 O'Connor, 2015). Nevertheless, note that in several real-world domains risk information is 368 naturally present in numerical format (e.g., the betting odds at a sporting event).
369
Another key finding was that discriminability was negatively affected by age, and 370 this also held when controlling for age differences in choice consistency. It thus seems that 371 older adults are less able to anticipate their own risky choices when asked to do so on a 372 likelihood rating scale. Our finding appears to be at odds with research that has shown a 373 stronger association between intention and behavior with advancing age (Downs & Hausenblas, 2005; Hagger, Chatzisarantis, & Biddle, 2002) . However, behaviors used to 375 study the intention-behavior gap-such as physical exercise, quitting smoking, eating 376 behavior, and alcohol use-tap into goal setting and implementation, to which older adults 377 may have more experience than younger adults (e.g., Hagger et al., 2002) . One possible 378 explanation for our finding is age-related decline in controlled cognitive processes (e.g.,
379
Hartshorne & Germine, 2015). Self-report, multi-option likelihood scales might require more 380 cognitive effort than do simple, binary choice tasks (cf. Frey et al., 2015) . Further, the age 381 differences in discriminability might be due to differences in the ability to mentally simulate, This avenue of research could reveal new insight into the degree to which some risk taking 391 measures are more demanding than others and whether a minimum level of cognitive ability 392 may be necessary for reliable responding. Nevertheless, our findings imply that researchers 393 need to be careful when drawing inferences about age differences in risk taking irrespective 394 of the type of measure used.
395
Unexpectedly, we found that discriminability was also affected by risk taking 396 tendency, such that likelihood ratings were less discriminative of risky choices among 397 participants who accepted many gambles than among those who accepted only few gambles.
398
This finding could imply that groups of individuals who more often engage in risky activities (e.g., offenders; Pachur et al., 2010; Rolison et al., 2013) may be less able to report reliably 400 on their likelihood of risk taking. Hence, group differences in apparent risk taking might 401 depend on whether risk taking propensities are assessed using self-report or behavioral tasks.
402
Nevertheless, further research is required to establish whether this finding can be replicated.
403
Likelihood rating scales and behavioral tasks differ both in their reliance on self- to the base rate of signal events (Estes & Maddox, 1995; Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007) .
429
Our study has a number of possible limitations. First, we studied people's choice 430 behavior for gambles with hypothetical outcomes, rather than ones that had real financial 431 consequences. However, our current goal was to probe the relationship between self-report 432 and choice for tasks that had similar potential outcomes. Had we incentivised responses in the Wehrung, 1990). Third, we studied the relationship between self-report and choice only in the 446 financial domain. While it was important to ensure for our present purposes that participants' 447 likelihood ratings and their choices were both based on the same gambling problems, the 448 relationship between self-report and choice might depend on the risk domain. Potentially, some domains of risk (e.g., the health domain) contain greater ambiguity about the possible 450 outcomes and probabilities than others.
451
Conclusion
452
We demonstrate that self-reported likelihoods of engaging in a risky activity reflect a 
Appendix B
Instructions used in for unambiguous gambling problems:
Thank you for agreeing to take part in our study. The study explores how people think about uncertain outcomes.
We have designed a set of gambles that we would like you to evaluate. Each gamble has two possible outcomes (a win or a loss). Each outcome is characterized by an amount ($10, $20, or $30 ) that can be won or lost and a chance (i.e., probability) of winning or losing (25%, 50%, or 75%):
(a) win or loss amount ($10, $20, $30) (b) chance of winning or losing (25%, 50%, 75%)
Here is an example of the kind of gamble you will be shown: In total, you will be shown 54 such gambles, divided into two blocks. For one block, you will be asked whether or not you would accept each gamble. For another block, you will instead be asked how likely you would be to accept each gamble. You may begin with either block. Finally, you will be asked 5 short demographic questions.
Instructions used in for ambiguous gambling problems:
We have designed a set of gambles that we would like you to evaluate. Each gamble has two possible outcomes (a win or a loss) that occur with some probability. The outcome can be one of three amounts of money, either $10, $20, or $30, that can be either won or lost. The chance (i.e., probability) of winning or losing can be either 25%, 50%, or 75%.
To help you understand these chances, you can think of a bag containing 100 tokens. When, for instance, the chance of winning is 75% and the chance of losing is 25%, there are 75 blue tokens and the remaining 25 are red. Imagine drawing one of the tokens from the bag without looking. If you draw one of the 75 blue tokens you win the specified amount. If you draw one of the 25 red tokens you lose the specified amount.
For each gamble, either the gain amount ($10, $20, $30), loss amount ($10, $20, $30), or the chance of winning or losing (25%, 50%, 75%) will be unknown.
Here is an example of the kind of gamble you will be shown:
Example 1:
Gamble: You win $10 with a chance of 25%
You lose $ ? with a chance of 75%
In this gamble, you have a 25% chance of winning $10 and a 75% chance of losing an unknown amount of either $10, $20, or $30.
Example 2:
Gamble: You win $20 with a chance of ? % You lose $10 with a chance of ? % In this gamble, you have a chance of winning $20 or to lose $10, but the probability of winning or losing is unknown.
You will first be shown 54 such gambles, divided into two blocks. For one block, you will be asked whether or not you would accept each gamble. For another block, you will instead be asked how likely you would be to accept each gamble. You may begin with either block. You will then be asked to evaluate a final set of 27 gambles. Finally, you will be asked 4 short demographic questions.
Appendix C
We conducted a mixed-effects logistic regression on participants' decisions (accept vs. reject) and included the gamble's expected value, the condition (ambiguous vs unambiguous), and participants' age (as a continuous variable) as predictors. Information about either the gain amount, loss amount, or the chances to win and lose was missing on ambiguous gambles. However, participants were told that the missing gain or loss amount was equal to $10, $20, or $30, and that the missing chances were 25%, 50%, or 75%. Thus, we calculated the expected value of ambiguous gambles by substituting the missing information with the middle amount (i.e., $20) and probability (i.e., 50%). 1 Gambles with a higher expected value were more often accepted (b = 0.23, t = 51.45, p < .001; Panel A in Figure A1 ). Ambiguous gambles were less often accepted (34%) than unambiguous (40%) gambles (b = -0.44, t = 2.29, p = .022; Panel A in Figure A1 ), indicating ambiguity aversion.
As age increased, fewer gambles were accepted (b = -0.02, t = 2.51, p = .012). Two-way interaction terms were included in a second block and revealed an interaction between condition and the expected value of the gambles (b = -0.07, t = 7.80, p < .001). This is because participants were less responsive to changes in the expected value of ambiguous gambles (b = 0.20, t = 33.95, p < .001) than they were for unambiguous gambles (b = 0.28, t = 36.95, p < .001). Panel A in Figure A1 shows that this was true particularly when the expected value was positive, further indicating that participants' ambiguity aversion was partly driven by their pessimistic beliefs about the missing information. Age also interacted with the expected value of the gambles (b = -0.001, t = 2.11, p = .035), whereby older age was associated with a reduced sensitivity to a gamble's expected value.
1 The expected values of ambiguous gambles provided a better fit in the regression model when based on the middle amounts ($20) and chances (50%) than when based on participants' judgments about the most likely missing values. Nonetheless, participants' mean judgments for the missing values reflected their risk aversion for ambiguous gambles. They judged a missing gain as equally likely to be small (32%), medium (36%), or large (33%), but judged a missing loss as more likely to be medium (36%) or large (40%) than small (24%), and judged a missing chance to win as more likely to be low (36%) or medium (40%) than high (24%) in probability.
In addition to deciding whether to accept or reject the gambles, participants rated in a separate block the likelihood that they would accept each one. We conducted a mixed effects linear regression on their likelihood ratings and included the gamble's expected value, the condition (ambiguous vs unambiguous), and participants' age (as a continuous variable)
as predictors. In keeping with our analysis of participants' decisions, the expected values of ambiguous gambles were calculated by substituting the missing information with the middle amount ($20) and probability (50%) on the scale of possible values. Participants rated a higher likelihood that they would accept lotteries with a higher expected value (b = 0.12, t = 92.90, p < .001; Panel B in Figure A1 ). As age increased, participants rated a lower likelihood of accepting lotteries (b = -0.01, t = 2.23, p = .026). Overall, participants rated that they were less likely to accept ambiguous lotteries (M = 3.19, SD = 1.97) than unambiguous lotteries (M = 3.42, SD = 2.19), but this difference was not significant (b = -0.18, t = 1.80, p = .073; Panel B in Figure A1 ). However, when two-way interaction terms were included in a second block, condition interacted with the expected value of the lotteries (b = -0.02, t = 8.65, p < .001). This was because participants were less responsive to changes in the expected value of ambiguous lotteries (b = 0.02, t = 46.03, p < .001) than they were for unambiguous lotteries (b = 0.13, t = 75.58, p < .001; Panel B in Figure A1 ). Finally, there was a marginally significant interaction between age and the expected value of the lotteries (b = -0.0002, t = 1.91, p = .056), indicating that older age was associated with a reduced sensitivity to a gamble's expected value. 
